

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

11 December 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Morning Meeting of 11 December 1969

25X1

DD/I called attention to the item by Henry J. Taylor in the Washington Daily News and provided the Director and others with a copy of a classified commentary on the article. (Attached)

Godfrey briefed on the rather apparent hijacking of a South Korean commercial airliner. He displayed a map charting its course from Seoul to the eastern coast and north to North Korea. He commented that, per a decision reached within the White House Situation Room, Dr. Kissinger was called on this matter early this morning and noted that we do not yet know who might have been aboard.

Godfrey briefly noted that Ambassador Palmer may make a formal statement on the situation in Libya.

Godfrey reported that they are giving Kosygin's most recent statement on Egypt an intensive hard look.

Godfrey provided the Director with a recently completed memorandum on "The Current Israeli Posture Toward Egypt." The Director agreed to its receiving the normal limited distribution.

D/ONE reviewed the situation in Libya, noted the differences of opinion which exist within this Government on whether to hang on to Wheelus Air Force Base, and commented that the reported suspense date for reaching a decision is 15 December.

5X1 noted receipt of a telephone call from Bob Michaels concerning the article by Henry J. Taylor. The Director asked the DD/I to

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
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X1 provide [] with his classified critique for [] background use. 25X
DD/I noted the extremely high classification of his critique. 25X



X1 The Director noted Admiral Raborn's call of yesterday requesting 25X
that Senator Bellmon and some other senators be briefed. The Director
advised [] that it is all right to brief only Senator Bellmon. 25X

X1 The Director questioned [] on how the procedures would really 25X
work as described in the revised talking paper on "Release of Sensitive
Information to Congress," contained in today's USIB agenda. [] 25X
provided a partially satisfactory response.



for L. K. White

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Henry Taylor / Facts for Helsinki



THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY has notified Gerard C. Smith, chief U.S. negotiator at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in Helsinki, that the Soviet Union is devoting approximately 70 per cent of its budget to far-distant strategic offensive and defensive systems. Moreover, CIA evidence makes it clear

that the Kremlin would try for a knockout nuclear first strike, based on surprise, and is literally preparing for this.

Mr. Smith has been informed that behind the scenes Russia's secret planning absolutely includes the use of space weapons, and that this is tied in with a new and startling Soviet underground test.

The CIA has found that on Sept. 2 Russia secretly tested, 60 miles from a place called Perm, a major 20-kiloton nuclear device which was the Soviet Union's eighth 1969 underground test and the 76th since the atmospheric test-ban treaty of 1963.

BOTH our country and the Soviet Union announced adherence to the United Nations General Assembly resolution banning "the placing of nuclear weapons in orbit." But the CIA's agents in Russia discovered that this test near Perm was for the benefit of the USSR's immense and rapidly expanding Tallinn anti-ballistic missiles defense system, which is related to orbiting weapons and for which this Sept. 2 test was decisive.

We implemented the U.S. resolution by signing with much fanfare in 1967 the U.S.-Russian treaty outlawing nuclear weapons in space. But neither the resolution nor the treaty bans their manufacture or contains any provision for inspection (essential), or has a penalty for violation.

Actually, as long ago as July 4, 1965, Communist Party chief Leonid Brezhnev confided to some left-wing British scientists in London

that Russia does possess "orbital space weapons." And four months later a three-stage potential space weapon appeared in the Moscow Revolution Day parade on Nov. 7, 1965.

Behind the scenes, Washington reaction was all but incredible. Speaking for former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, Air Force Secretary Harold Brown stated: "The Defense Department does not believe any of this. First, the orbiting weapon is not a very good idea. Second, there is now a U.N. ban against it." And this is the kind of earlier thinking that Mr. Smith faces in Helsinki.

The CIA is advising him that the Soviet Union is not only proceeding all-out in a space-weapon program but has now code-named such weapons Scrag. Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in turn, has likewise notified Mr. Smith that "the Joint Chiefs' focus of concern is upon the capability the United States possesses to define and respond to such a threat."

IN June, 1965, Mr. McNamara junked 14 intercontinental ballistic missile complexes with 113 Atlas and Titan launching sites in 12 states as a result of his declaring obsolete the missiles they were built to accommodate at a building cost of \$856.9 million. Mr. McNamara switched our nation's dependence to the Minuteman. But within two years, mistakenly convinced that Russia would follow suit and in his bid for this, Mr. McNamara ordered that Minuteman production be stopped, too. We have not produced a single one of these mainstay defense weapons since 1967.

Instead of following suit, Russia continued producing giant intercontinental missiles, and the CIA is now grimly informing Mr. Smith that they have stepped these up to an output of 300 a month.

Mr. Smith sits in Helsinki with mostly (all but five) civilians on his 24-man team. He faces five Soviet full generals, two colonels and an admiral — and new CIA facts which must send a shudder up his back.